In this paper we consider Georgescu-Roegen's approach to uncertainty, showing that his characterization of expectations cannot be reduced to any probabilistic decision-making model. Drawing upon Georgescu-Roegen's lesson a lexicographical utility function is proposed and analysed in the mark of his own peculiar scientific methodology. It is demonstrated that such a formulation can be useful in solving the usual failure of the expected utility model, such as the Ellsberg paradoxes. The epistemic limits of our re-construction are considered.
INTRODUCTION 1
In his introduction to volume Analytical Economics, Paul Samuelson writes: 'Professor Georgescu-Roegen has been a pioneer in mathematical economics. The times have almost caught up with him; but unlike the hare, he moves ahead of his pursuers in a divergent series. . . . For in Georgescu-Roegen we have a scholar's scholar, an economist's economist' (Analytical Economics, Introduction, p. vii) .
We can undoubtedly agree with Samuelson's words. Indeed, GeorgescuRoegen (GR) has been a master of economics. His contributions in consumer and producer theory, in institutional and mathematical economics (to cite just a few) are milestones of the economic discipline; his studies of Interestingly enough, GR contributions in these fields have been largely neglected by the subsequent literature. 4 Even his biographers, highlighting his contributions to the theory of consumer's choice, 5 point out his lessons about preferences' discontinuity in utility representation, without making references to GR's opinion about what he conceived as the 'main' problem, namely the definition of the 'true' nature of uncertainty. This is an interesting puzzle from the standpoint of the history of economic thought, which alone might justify an analysis of GR's lessons. However, we believe there is more than historical curiosity to motivate re-thinking about GR's contributions. Indeed, GR's analysis of choice under uncertainty should be seen as a typical lesson about how mathematics has to be used in economics. For, GR's opinion was that a model should not derive consequences that depend more on its internal theoretical structure than on the characteristics of the problem for the solution of which it has been constructed. This need appears to us particularly evident for models of decision making under uncertainty and it motivates us to shed new light on GR's legacy.
In our work we investigate the problem of choice under uncertainty, which is tied to the issue of the nature and proper formalization of expectations for agents who aim at choosing what is best for them in an uncertain situation, i.e. looking for what they expect to be their best option. The open questions that GR addressed and that we consider in our work are (1) what expectations are; (2) which relationship they have with probabilities, and (3) how we can provide a representation for preferences coherent with logic and factual behaviours. In section 2 we address these questions, reconstructing GR's definition of expectation and highlighting a possible interpretation of the concept of credibility of an expectation. In section 3 we propose an interpretation of GR model in terms of a lexmin utility function, and show that our formalization can be useful in solving the expected utility paradoxes pointed out by Ellsberg. In order to do so, a discussion of the possible use of the Principle of Insufficient Reason in GR's model is proposed. In the concluding remarks of section 4 we discuss the limits of our interpretation of GR's model in terms of its epistemic structure; this, we argue, may (at least partially) explain the scarce impact that this element of GR's analysis has had in the subsequent literature. Nevertheless, they are entirely different essences [in note: Knight preceded Keynes in noticing and analysing this difference]' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1954, pp. 527-8, my italics) . 4 Interestingly enough, Ellsberg has been the only scholar working in decision making under uncertainty who made an explicit reference to GR's contributions (Ellsberg, 1961, footnote 8, p. 659 and 2, p. 664) . 5 See Zamagni (1979) and Maneschi and Zamagni (1997) .
EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY
The problem of representing agents' decision making under uncertainty is tied to the issue of defining expectations. An expectation, for GR, is a state of mind about a fact, a statement, an object, about which the agent does not have an absolute knowledge. 6 Knowledge is a primitive of such a definition. Assuming it, we can represent an expectation by means of the following triple:
where i denotes the individual, E the (set of) evidence that is available to him/her and p the statement, or proposition, that he/she is predicting.
7
Notice that, from definition (1), it appears evident that the concept of expectation is more general than probability, since it does not rely on any 'spurious' definition of 'degree of belief' (or similar) that has been used to define probabilities. Indeed, the problem of understanding what an expectation is and what is its relationship with probability depends precisely on studying the link between E and p. For GR, probabilities are just one class of expectations, yet not a univocal one. It is that set of expectations for which a single numerical measure can be constructed calling on some logical argument about the nexus between E and p that justifies the use of that measure. This set is not univocal because it varies according to the different definitions of probability that have been proposed by several theories. Each model, i.e. each theory, cannot be satisfactory in its attempt to provide a single measure of uncertainty, since the latter is something that, in general, '. . . cannot be meaningfully connected to real [or complex] numbers . . . ' (GeorgescuRoegen, 1958, p. 242) . But this is exactly one of the points that GR addresses in the approach to mathematization of economics or, indeed, to the general problem of science, i.e. the relationship between the world and its measures. There is no exhaustive definition of probability exactly because there are several possible theories that can all be equally defined and criticized. Each 6 Georgescu-Roegen (1958, p. 243) . 7 While there are no problems in understanding i and p, it is necessary to clarify what GR supposes that evidence is. E can be interpreted as a specific subset of the knowledge, namely that subset that is available to i when thinking about p. Even if, ideally, the evidence encompasses all the knowledge of the individual (GR calls this 'the Principle of Absolute Knowledge'), it has to be admitted that in 'real life' E includes just a subset of the whole 'ideal' E, namely that set of evidence, opinions, etc. that i 'can bring into sharp focus at the proper moment' (GeorgescuRoegen, 1958, p. 244) . Such an explanation, intuitive as it might appear, implies some difficulties about the type of knowledge we assume that i holds, i.e. what i knows about what he/she does not know. We postpone the discussion about this point to section 4.
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theory is justified because of a need to encompass in a structured and logical relationship the reality that it analyses. However, any reality is far more complex than the model constructed over it. In GR's terminology, models, based on logic, are arithmomorphic: 8 discrete, sharp representations of the reality which leave qualitative attributes outside the description; the reality is a dialectical continuum, i.e. it is a continuum of entities that are different yet non-completely distinguishable one from the other.
9
It is therefore not surprising that for GR there is no 'correct' definition of probability, and that each one implies unacceptable restrictions about the type of uncertainty that it measures. Let us consider explicitly the subjectivists' approach to probability.
10 In the subjective model, internal consistency (addition of probabilities of mutually exclusive events and multiplication of probabilities of independent events) is the only criterion that is needed to define a probability p as the numerical coefficient that measures the subjective degree of belief in p. This claim is thoroughly criticized by GR; the point is made extremely clear and is worthwhile citing it in full: ' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, p. 21) . 9 'A vast number of concepts [. . .] among them are the most vital concepts for human judgments, like "good", "justice", "likelihood", "want", etc. [. . .] have no arithmomorphic boundaries; instead, they are surrounded by a penumbra within which they overlap with their opposites.
[. . .] It goes without saying, to [this] category of concepts we cannot apply the fundamental law of Logic, the Principle of Contradiction: "B cannot be both A and non-A". On the contrary we must accept that in certain instances at least, "B is both A and non-A" is the case. [. . .] I propose to refer to these concepts that may violate the Principle of Contradiction as dialectical' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, p. 23) . 10 In the 1958 paper, GR discusses and criticizes also the 'Classical' school, the Frequentist one and the ultra-subjectivist approach of Shakle (1949 Shakle ( , 1955 . Notice that such a classification is not common nowadays, due to the inclusion of Shackle's view as a specific 'ultra-subjectivist' probability theory. Shackle's works are now considered either as a non-coherent theory of probability (see GR's opinion about the unclear and vague wording of Shakle's axiom 1, 3 and 7 (Shakle, 1949, pp. 131-2) , in Georgescu-Roegen (1958, note 80)) or as an open yet incomplete hint that opened the path towards non-probabilistic measures (Basili and Zappia, 2003) . One could explain the GR's classification on an historical basis, since the problem of probability's foundations was in the 1950s a more open argument than it appears now, mainly because of the breakthrough of Savage's contribution and the following unifying approach of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) which is now widely accepted, at least as a starting point for further theoretical advances.
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Fulvio Fontini [. . .] if all events could be expressed as Boolian polynomials of some elementary events that need only to be mutually exclusive, the structure of the beliefs of any individual would be completely characterized by the manner in which he would distribute probabilities to these elementary events. This probability distribution is otherwise arbitrary and does not have to reflect any stochastic aspect of the material world. In maintaining that such a theory is fully adequate to deal with rational actions in the face of uncertainty, the Subjectivist is exactly like a geometrician who would claim that any geometry topologically equivalent to that of the material world is all we need to explain our understanding and use of space properties. For, certainly, a theory of probability cannot concern itself only with the internal consistency of the acts of an individual, as maintained by Savage [in note: Savage, Foundations, . 'Because that theory [of personal probability] is a code of consistency for the person applying it, not a system of predictions about the world around him']. Ordinary logic would suffice for this. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 259) Moreover, also the attempt to justify probability as the measure of the expectation for all types of uncertain situations cannot be shared, since it is not always the case that such a measure exists. Consider the following two properties of any measure (and thus of the subjective probability one): comparability and ordinal measurability. The former refers to a specific structure of the preferences (or any binary relationship that expresses i's choices), namely being a chain (a completely ordered set). The latter relies on the possibility of representing comparability unambiguously by a chain of real numbers, i.e. 'where to each element one can assign a real number which will completely identify its relative ranking' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1954, p. 201 , original text in italics). GR was among the first (Georgescu-Roegen, 1954) to understand that ordinal measurability implies comparability, but the converse need not be true, since any chain is a lattice, but not all lattices are ordinally measurable (e.g. see Topkis, 1998, The problem of the definition of a measure p in the subjective theory is exactly that, within this approach, ordinal measurability needs to be assumed to define the 'single' probability, without any more justification than the need to provide a measure for probability, which is a tautology.
12 This appears clear in the Savage axiomatization, where axioms P1-P4 guarantee just the existence of what Savage calls a 'qualitative probability', 13 while the continuity axiom P6 is needed to derive a 'quantitative' probability p.
14 Given the rationale outlined above, one can share GR's view that the probability measure p captures just 'some' of the world complexity.
15 This does not imply that a numerical probability cannot be used in all those cases in which there is some evidence that might 'suggest' its use, provided that these measures are qualitatively ranked according to the logical link between E and p. Consider the following example: 16 Example 2: Suppose that there are four urns, whose evidence can be summarized as: E1: 'in the urn U1 one half of the balls are white and one half are black'; E2: 'the frequency of white in 3426 independent extractions from urn U2 was 1/2'; E3: 'two independent extractions from urn U3 resulted in one black and one white'; E4: 'the urn U4 contains some balls'. Let i be asked to name a betting quotient for each urn and then choose his/her bet among urns.
17 He/she will typically rank preferences 18 as E1 ՝ E2 ՝ E3 ՝ E4, even though the probability (the 'betting quotient') is 1/2 for urns U1, U2, U3 and (possibly) U4.
The reason is that there is a qualitative ranking of the estimates of the frequencies embedded in the evidence. The estimate of the proportions of balls is 'sure' in E1 (since it is known), less sure in E2 and even less in E3. It is completely unknown in E4. In a sense, it is as if there is an ordering of what GR defines the credibility of each probability measure, which depends on the 'quality' and amount of information i has.
This stimulates us to interpret GR's decision-making criterion as a lexicographic one, composed of a probabilistic judgment and its subjective qualitative component, namely its credibility. This point will be further discussed in the next section. However, before doing so, we need to clarify what credibility is (or better what we believe GR meant it to be). Denote m ∈ + ‫ގ‬ as the number of white balls drawn from an urn, n ∈ + ‫ގ‬ the number of black, and let Um,n index urns according to the amount of m and n extracted from it. Assume that the prediction p is: 'the next ball extracted will be white'. Clearly, the space of all possible urns is ‫ގ‬ + 2 . A certain frequency can be represented on a m, n space as the straight line whose slope is m/(m + n). The frequency represents the probability, or, to use GR's terminology, the betting quotient.
19 There is another parameter that has to be taken into account, the credibility of the betting quotient. This should not be understood as a numerical parameter that measure the 'degree of uncertainty' (Dow and Werlang, 1994; Marinacci, 2000) , ranging from risk to Knightian uncertainty, according to the amount of observation available; if this were the case, GR's expectation could be reduced to a capacity, i.e. a non-additive probability. The crucial point is that the credibility embeds a subjective qualitative aspect that makes it impossible to fuse it together with the probability into a single capacity measure. Consider the following example, proposed by GR, in which he imagined an agent who is asked to choose among bets having the same frequencies:
Example 3: Suppose there are four urns (U0,3; U0,6; U3,0; U6,0), whose evidence can be summarized as: E1: m = 0, n = 3; E2: m = 0, n = 6; E3: m = 3, n = 0; E4: m = 6, n = 0. Let p be: 'next ball drawn is white' and assume that the consequence of p is positive (betting on white is the most desired outcome). An individual i will typically rank preferences between E1 and E2 and between E3 and E4 as E1 ՝ E2, E4 ՝ E3, even though the probability (the 'betting quotient') is the same between both pairs of urns. This example shows that there are two dimensions of the credibility of a betting quotient. The first one refers to the amount of observation the decision maker has, i.e. m + n. Let us call this dimension of the credibility its index. The second one depends on whether the evidence is favourable or not, in the sense that the evidence agrees with the desired one: 'This principle also seems intuitive [. . .] . The individual has a stronger belief in the hypothesis that the urn U0,6 contains only non-white balls than in the same hypothesis for U0,3' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 268) . 20 This second dimension of credibility is its favourableness. We can therefore define credibility as the composed function:
defined on expectations, 21 where the index of credibility is i(e), which depends on the amount of evidence m + n, and the second dimension f(e) is the favourableness of the credibility that depends on whether the evidence m + n agrees or not with the agent's desired outcome.
LEXMIN UTILITY AND THE ELLSBERG PARADOXES
On the basis of our interpretation of GR we have defined credibility as a parameter, depending on evidence, that is related to the betting quotient without being a substitute for it. On the other hand, according to GR, the betting quotient too is a subjective parameter in the sense that it depends on i's subjective utility; therefore, it should be intended as an expected utility rather than an expected value: ' [Ramsey, 1926, p. 172] proposed to measure the subjective probability by the betting quotient the individual is willing to accept on the given uncertain events, [. . .] . But Ramsey [. . .] realize [d] that in order to obtain the correct measure, the betting quotient has to be expressed in terms of utility, not in terms of money ' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 263) .
These arguments lead us to follow the intuition of GR and propose a model of decision making under uncertainty based on GR's arguments. On the basis of our reconstruction of his analysis, the model can be formalized as a lexicographic utility function that depends hierarchically on the expected value of a certain expectation and its credibility. Let us see how. Define the space of all expectations as Q, which can be understood as a space of lotteries whenever expectations are of the type described in Example 2, 22 but which in general need not be restricted as such and suppose that a function U : Θ → ‫ޒ‬ 2 exists. We can represent GR's decision-making model by means of a lexicographical utility function U:
where ՆGR is the following lexicographic (i.e. complete, antisymmetric, preordering) ordering:
exp indicates the probabilistic expected value and C is the credibility function C: Θ → ‫,ޒ‬ defined in equation (2). It is possible to prove 23 the existence of the lexmin function in (3) for quite general structures 24 for Q (which include the lottery space of Example 2 as a subset), provided that Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms hold with respect to (w.r.t.) the preference relation defined in (4), except for the Archimedean one.
We can represent graphically this decision-making criterion in the space m, n (see figure 1) . Along a straight line (starting from the origin) an agent has the same betting quotient. Preferences are represented by the arrows: the first criterion, the betting quotient, is represented by the choice among straight lines, denoted by the continuous arrow. Thus, in figure 1, b ՝ a since mb/(mb + nb) > ma/(ma + na). The second criterion, the credibility, is denoted by dashed arrows and represents choices along a straight line. Both the index of credibility and its favourableness are used to compare any two points along the line (such as a and a′, b and b′); favourableness, in particular, specifies the direction of the arrow, i.e. whether it points towards the origin or away from it. From this, it should be self-evident that the index of credibility and the favourableness of credibility are not to be taken as two distinct criteria in the lexmin utility function, i.e. are not the second and third moment of the process of elicitation of preferences, but are both encompassed in the second component of the lexmin, namely in the credibility of the expectation.
The lexmin utility of equation (3) is the best we can do in formalizing GR's intuitions without providing an axiomatic basis for its foundations. 25 Here, we intend to show that, if our conjectures are to be agreed on, the GR utility function in (3) has some interesting properties which positively justify its adoption as a criterion of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, we show that it is coherent with the patterns of behaviour highlighted by the Ellsberg paradoxes.
Consider the following version of the paradox:
Example 4 (Ellsberg two-colour paradox) : Suppose that i has four expectations: p2) ; where evidences are: E1: 'in the urn U1 one half of the balls are red and one half are black', E2: 'in the urn U2 there are some red and some black balls'; and previsions are: p1: 'next ball drawn is red'; p2: 'next ball drawn is black', where it is assumed that the consequence of each pj, j = 1, 2, is positive (guessing the prevision correctly is the most desired outcome); i will typically rank expectations as e1 ՝ e2, e3 ՝ e4, even though the probability (the 'betting quotient') is the same for all urns.
25 Which is far beyond the scope of our paper. 
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The utility function defined in equation (3) 'solves' the paradox, in the sense that its ranking of preferences agrees with the observed (or conjectured) ranking of the example:
Claim 1: The ranking of the utility defined in (3) w.r.t. expectations defined in Example 4 is
The difference in credibility are justified by the observation that the index of credibility for e1, e3 is at its maximum 26 while it is null for e2, e4 27 (favourableness is equal across these expectations). A similar argument can be made about the three-colour version of the paradox:
Example 5 (Ellsberg three-colour paradox) : Suppose that i has four expectations: e1 = (E1, p1), e2 = (E1, p2), e3 = (E1, p3), e4 = (E1, p4); where evidence is E1: 'in the urn U1 one-third of the balls are red and two-thirds are either black or yellow', and previsions are: p1: 'next ball drawn is red'; p2: 'next ball drawn is black', p3: 'next ball drawn is either red or yellow'; p4: 'next ball drawn is either black or yellow', where it is assumed that the consequence of each pj, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is positive (guessing the prevision correctly is the most desired outcome); i will typically rank expectations as e1 ՝ e2, e4 ՝ e3, even though ε ε π π π π ε ε
, which contradicts the observed (or conjectured) rank of expectations if π pj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is a probability.
In making the following claim, we focus on the first dimension of credibility, namely its index. The discussion of favourableness is postponed to the end of this section.
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Claim 2: The ranking of the utility defined in (3) w.r.t. expectations defined in Example 5 is
Our claims hold true if i's behaviour does not depend on the expected value of each expectation but on its credibility. A sufficient (yet not necessary) condition for this is that the Principle of Insufficient Reason 29 (IR) holds. In other words, it is as if the agent conceives the betting quotient as the subjective probability, but does not trust completely such a conjecture if it is 26 It is infinite, since it corresponds to the frequency limit. 27 There is no frequency that justifies the betting quotient of e2 and e4. 28 See footnote 35 below. 29 Also called Principle of Indifference, claims for equal treatment of 'similar' cases.
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based only on a logical rule adopted ex ante (such as the Principle of IR), rather than on evidence. Clearly, the Principle of IR can be criticized in several ways.
30 GR himself was quite critical about it. Discussing Carnap's probability theory (Carnap, 1950) he notices: 'it is also clear that his rules [the rules that Carnap claims should be used to define the a priori probability] [. . .] involve the Principle of Insufficient Reason. A discussion of these rules will disclose, for the nth time, the slippery handles of that principle' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 257) . Another interesting (indirect) objection to it was posed by Ellsberg. In his famous article (Ellsberg, 1961) he claims that the notion of 'credibility' for GR is similar to the notion of 'ambiguity' that he proposes; 31 yet, according to Ellsberg, GR's lexmin preference ordering does not solve a modified version of the paradoxes, if the Principle of IR holds, since it does not allow to compensate credibility with expected payoff: 'Many subjects will still prefer to bet on [ p1 in U1] than [ p1 in U2] in our [two-colour] example, even when the proportion of red to black in [U1] is lowered to 49:51 [. . .] . But at some point, as the "unambiguous" likelihood becomes increasingly unfavourable, their choices will switch' (Ellsberg, 1961, p. 664) . We can notice two points about Ellsberg's statement. First of all, according to the analysis we have developed here, Ellsberg's first claim that GR's credibility is somehow similar to his concept of ambiguity does not appear correct. 32 In fact, credibility for GR is a more complex concept than Ellsberg's ambiguity: the latter depends on the degree of confidence about the probabilistic judgment (see Eichberger and Kelsey, 1999) , while the former has two dimensions, the index and the favourableness of the evidence, which depend on the amount of evidence and the relationship between the betting quotient and the desired outcome. The second reply to Ellsberg's observation involves the problem of whether in settings such as those suggested by the modified version of the two-colour paradox it makes sense to assume, as Ellsberg conjectures that GR does, that i keeps on maintaining a 50:50 expectation about the drawing of red in the unknown urn. We believe that Ellsberg's conjecture about GR's model is not fully convincing. The justification for a 50:50 expectation on the ambiguous relies on the Principle of IR, if this is to be taken as a compelling argument in favour of equidistribution 30 This point is too vast to be discussed here. See Keynes (1921) and Carnap (1950) . Notice that not all authors share the same critical point about it; witness, for instance, Savage's opinion: 'the principle of insufficient reason has been and, I think, will continue to be a most fertile idea in the theory of probability' (Savage, 1954, p. 64) . See also Sinn (1980) . 31 Ellsberg's decision-making criterion has been axiomatized by Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) , who have shown that it can be represented by means of a Choquet Integral, given some 'degree of confidence' on the probabilistic measure p. 32 However, it has to be noticed that Ellsberg himself admitted that 'These highly pertinent articles [Georgescu-Roegen, 1954 , 1958 came to my attention only after this paper had gone to the printer, allowing no space for comments here' (Ellsberg, 1961, note 8, p. 659) .
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Fulvio Fontini of probabilities across mutually exclusive events that are supposed to be equally likely. It is apparent that such an interpretation of the Principle would be a tautology. We believe that we can relax this assumption and still show that the pattern of preferences supposed by Ellsberg agrees with GR's one, provided that the model is 'closed' by means of some extension of the Principle that is justified on the basis of some logic and positive rationale. Recall that the rationale behind the IR is that similar cases should receive the same treatment if there is no reason (evidence) that suggests for a deviation. However, the definition of 'similar cases' is not univocally determined ex ante. It is generally assumed that the category of similarity refers to events within urns (i.e. within the same level of uncertainty); however, we might as well assume that i considers similarity across urns (i.e. between choices that embed different levels of uncertainty) in all those cases in which there is no evidence that justifies a different composition of the urns. In other words, we can suppose that when i is asked to compare two urns (where the betting quotient is known for just one of them) he/she assumes that the frequencies of the unknown one correspond to those of the observed one if there is no evidence that contradicts it. Let us call this a Principle of Comparability. It can be regarded as an extension of the Principle of IR that takes into account the psychological principle according to which individuals, when analysing some uncertain problem, refer to the most similar case they have in mind to make a decision about it. 33 We can easily show that GR's utility function solves the modified paradox, provided that the Principle of Comparability replaces the Principle of IR. Define en as the vector of expectations about p1 (drawing a red ball) from U1 in Example 4 for a sequence of evidence En in which, in each step, a black ball replaces a red one in urn U1 (i.e. E1: m = 50, n = 50; E2: m = 49, n = 51; E3: m = 48, n = 52, etc.), and let ε n * be the vector of expectations about p1 from U2 that is pair-wise compared with each En. If the Principle of IR was to hold, ε n * would be a sequence of 1/2, and Ellsberg's opinion would be verified. However, by adopting the Principle of Comparability we have that exp exp( ) ε ε n n ( ) = * ; C C n n ε ε ( ) ≠ ( ) * . Recall equation (2). Credibility depends on two dimensions: the credibility index (i.e. the amount of observable frequency that justifies a certain betting quotient), and the favourableness, i.e. whether the betting quotient is against or in favour of the desired result. We can suppose, therefore, that there exists a certain threshold of expectationŝ ε* such that capture. To sayit using GR's terminology, our reconstruction does not capture the uncertainty about the boundaries of the dialectical reality (which cannot be captured by any arithmomorphic representation). Obviously, this does not reduce the importance of using arithmomorphic similes: 'no [one . . .] has ever denied either the unique ease with which thought handles arithmomorphic concepts or their tremendous usefulness. For these concepts possess a built-in device against most kind of errors of thought that dialectical concepts do not have' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, p. 27 ). However, it does lower both the interpretation of the model as a positive analysis of the reality and its viability as a normative construction.
Clearly, GR himself was well aware of this problem: 'there is a limit to what we can do with numbers, as there is to what we can do without them' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 275) . In other words, [. . .] there seems to be no other recommendation for dealing with Knightian uncertainty than the common advice: 'get all the facts and use good judgment'. But what is 'good judgment'? The concept seems to resist any attempt at an objective definition that also would be operational ex ante. [. . .] Together with gathering, presenting and analyzing in a logical fashion as many facts as possible, to detect and to use good judgment constitute the only mean by which we can respond to living without divine knowledge in an uncertain world. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1958, p. 275) Perhaps, it was GR's self-awareness of the limit of his own analysis that may have withheld many scholars to follow his example and that has discouraged researchers to undertake the difficult task of understanding GR's analytical framework and setting it within his coherent yet unorthodox methodological approach. 40 However, we believe that, as for the other parts of GR's analytical corpus, his lessons about expectations and uncertainty will provide a fertile ground of analysis, rich with fruitful insights and methodological hints, for those who will like to get inside the deep nature of the problem of expectations.
